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ABSTRACT 
Consider people viewing two print ads in a row: one is persuasive and attractive, the 
other is weak and boring. What will people feel about the ads after they have viewed both of 
them? Will they give the two ads the same judgments as people who see and rate only one of the 
ads? Previous research predicted two directions how people will distort their judgments: One is 
that they assimilate their judgement and believe that the two ads are more similar to each other 
when they saw two ads in a row than when they rate them individually (e.g., Girgus & Coren, 
1982; Hovland & Sherif, 1961; Stapel, Koomen & Pligt, 1997; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988). 
The other is that they contrast their judgements, and thus feeling that the two ads are more 
different from each other (e.g., Kenrick & Gutierres, 1980; Sherif, Taub, & Hoveland, 1958; 
Zellner, Rohm & Bassetti, 2003). One factor that decides which direction people will distort their 
judgments is whether the ads are from the same or different product types. Only when the target 
stimulus and its context are categorized as from the same group, will the context serve as a 
comparison standard for the target stimuli, and contrast effect will be invited (Coren & Enns, 
1993; Manis & Paskewitz, 1984; Staple & Winkielman, 1998; Zellner et al., 2002). When the 
sufficient comparison relevance is gone, assimilation will occur (Hovland & Sherif, 1961; 
Stapel, Koomen, & Pligt, 1997). The order of presentation is also tested in the present study, 
with focus on how the order affects people’s response towards each ad. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Context influences how people evaluate the components within it. Judgment of whether a 
particular item of food is good tasting or not can be different when it is assessed among pleasant-
tasting or unpleasant-tasting foods (Pol, Hihman, Baare, & Ree, 1998; Rota & Zellner, 2007; 
Zellner, Kern & Parker, 2002). To what extent we find a face attractive is influenced by whether 
it is preceded by a more attractive face or a less attractive one (Geislman, Haight & Kimata, 
1984; Wedell, Parcucci, & Geiselman, 1987). We feel a five-pound weight to be lighter than five 
pounds after lifting a 10-pound weight, and heavier than five pounds after lifting a two-pound 
weight. (Heintz, 1950; Parducci, 1965; Sherif & Hovland, 1964) All these are examples how 
context can influence our judgments.  
There is no such thing as a context-free judgment (Mellers & Birnbaum, 1983). In the 
present study, I tested whether and how people’s judgment towards advertisements would be 
influenced by the context. Two print ads were used as stimuli, a good one and a bad one—
certainly there are lots of criteria to judge good and bad ads, e.g., whether they are well designed, 
whether they are providing very intriguing storylines, etc. However, in the present study, I 
focused on the arguments of the ads, and two kinds of arguments were presented: strong and 
weak (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984).   
Previous studies showed two possibilities about how a pair of ads might be judged. First 
is that people assimilate their judgments of the two subjects (Girgus & Coren, 1982; Hovland & 
Sherif, 1961; Stapel, Koomen & Pligt, 1997; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988), meaning that 
people feel the two subjects are more similar to each other than they actually are. Several factors 
can lead to assimilation, including when people feel unfamiliar towards one or both commercials 
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(Herr, 1986), or the difference between the two commercials is small (Sherif, Taub, & Hovland, 
1958). When assimilation occurs, people tend to “average” the test subject and the context, 
giving an overall impression (Anderson, 1971; Anderson & Jacobson, 1965, Anderson, 1967); as 
a result, people will judge the originally good ad as worse, and the bad ad better. 
The other possibility is that people contrast their judgments (Kenrick & Gutierres, 1980; 
Sherif et al, 1958; Zellner, Rohm & Bassetti, 2003), meaning that people exaggerate the 
difference between two subjects. This happens when the two subjects are sufficiently similar to 
each other to serve as relevant comparison standards (Helmholtz, 1886/1962; Stapel et al., 1997), 
or when people change their judgment standards according to their current evaluating 
experiences (Helson, 1964). Both situations will be explained more below. As a result of contrast 
effects, people may judge the originally good ad as better, and the bad ad worse.  
In the present study I measured people’s attitudes toward two ads shown in sequence, 
based on both cognitive and affective properties (Crites, Fabrigar, & Petty, 1994). Previous 
studies focused on either cognitive (Girgus & Coren, 1982; Herr, 1983, 1986; Hovland, Harvey, 
& Sherif, 1956; Stapel & Winkielman, 1998) or affective aspects (Harris, 1932; Hunt & 
Volkmann, 1937; Zellner et al., 2002; Zellner, Strickhouser, & Tornow, 2004). However, both 
affect and cognition are important properties of attitudes, (Crites et al., 1994), and combining 
them is more similar to people’s daily media consumption habits—people not only judge 
whether a print ad is of good quality or not, but also whether they like or dislike it.  
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
I. Assimilation 
Assimilation in Cognition 
As mentioned above, contrast happens when there is comparison relevance between 
subjects and they are distinctive enough; and assimilation happens when the comparison 
relevance disappears and thus the comparison standards become ambiguous (Stapel et al., 1997; 
Stapel & Winkielman, 1998). Specifically, assimilation refers to when the target component is 
distorted in the direction of the surrounding context, and the perceived difference between the 
two subjects is smaller than the actual difference, and thus the apparent difference between target 
and context is reduced (Girgus & Coren, 1982; Jordan & Uhlarik, 1985; Weintraub & Schneck, 
1986). Two main factors will decide whether assimilation will take place— (a) when the subject 
to be judged is ambiguous or unfamiliar, in which case people have to rely on the context to 
make judgments; or (b) when there is a small distance between the subject and its context, in 
which case the difference cannot be clearly sensed. 
Ambiguity and Unfamiliarity 
Assimilation effects occur, first, when the test components are ambiguous or unfamiliar 
for subjects. How are participants supposed to answer a question that they have very little or 
even no idea about? It is supposed that they will refer to a previous question to see in what 
context the present question is embedded, and therefore decide whether they will agree or 
disagree with the item. This was tested in an experiment asking participants to rate the unfamiliar 
“Monetary Control Bill” after answering a familiar question about inflation (Schuman and 
Presser, 1981). Those who were the most concerned about inflation tended to favor the Monetary 
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Control Bill, because they inferred that the Monetary Control Bill was an anti-inflation measure 
and answered the item accordingly. In this case, the prior item provided a framework for 
interpreting later questions; when participants are not familiar with the subject they are asked to 
judge, they distort their answers to the direction of the context, in this case, the previous 
question.  
Another example can be found in trait judgments of people and animals. People will 
judge an unknown person, “Donald” for instance, as more hostile when primed with the name of 
famous shock-rocker, Alice Cooper (Herr, 1986). And when people judge an unknown animal 
(e.g., fictitious animal names), they think these animals are more ferocious when they have been 
primed with moderately ferocious animal exemplars (e.g., vulture, wolf, badger); however, this 
assimilation is eliminated when the experimenter uses real animal names, thus making the test 
component no longer ambiguous or unfamiliar. (Herr, 1983). Likewise, if the actions of a person 
to be judged are ambiguous (e.g., she might be unfriendly, or she might be shy and friendly), she 
will be judged shy and friendly if friendly cues were presented to participants before they form 
the impression, e.g., “Aladdin, Ghandi, and Mandela,” and “nice, gentle, and friendly”; however, 
she will be judged as unfriendly if participants receive unfriendly cues, such as “Dracula, Stalin, 
and Hitler,” or “mean, violent, and unfriendly” (Stapel et al., 1997; Zellner et al., 2003).  
Small distance 
The second factor resulting in assimilation is when there is a small distance between the 
test component and the context (Parducci & Marshall, 1962; Sherif et al., 1958). Imagine you are 
lifting weights. To lift a five-pound weight after a series of six-pound weights won’t seem like a 
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big difference; perhaps you would not even notice a difference. The five-pound weight would be 
assimilated to the similar six-pound weights. 
Another example is assimilation in visual illusions. Figure 1 is the Delboeuf illusion, in 
which people tend to judge the central circle in the left configuration as larger than the central 
circle in the middle configuration. This can be translated into predictions based upon spatial 
relations within a given stimulus. When the parts of the stimulus are spatially proximal, as in the 
left of Figure 1, they are presumably sampled in a single glance, meaning that the outer ring is in 
view whenever the observer is looking at the central circle, and hence they are pooled or 
assimilated (Girgus and Coren, 1982). 
Similar assimilation effects also occur in communication and social judgment. If there is 
a discrepancy between people’s held position and the stand advocated in the communication, and 
the discrepancy is only a small one, people may feel the two positions are more similar to each 
other (Hovland et al., 1957). This is similar to the lifting example mentioned above, when you 
are lifting a five-pound weight after a six pound one, it will be hard for you to sense the 
difference. As described below, assimilation effects in communication are, in fact, an extension 
of the assimilation that happens in making physical judgments (Heintz, 1950; McGarvey, 1943). 
Integration Theory 
What are people really doing when they are assimilating the test component with its 
context? They average them, according to integration theory: each stimulus has a value to the 
perceiver, and perceivers arrive at their impression by averaging these values (Anderson, 1971; 
Anderson & Jacobson, 1965). Therefore, in the left two circles of Figure 1, when the small 
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distance between two circles leads to assimilation, people tend to average the sizes of circles, and 
thus over-estimate the size of the central ring and under-estimate the size of the outer ring. 
Other factors that lead to assimilation 
Beside ambiguity, unfamiliarity, and small distance, the amount of cognitive capacity 
people are willing or able to use in the judging process may also lead to assimilation. For 
example, in communication judgments, when the topic is not very involving to participants, they 
care little about differentiating between two standings, and are more likely to shift their position 
towards the stand advocated in the communication (Hovland et al., 1957; Hovland & Pritzker, 
1957; Zimbardo, 1960). Another example is when people are asked to rate the attractiveness of 
two faces. When the two faces are presented simultaneously, people allocate fewer cognitive 
resources towards each face, thus giving similar attractiveness scores toward the two targets in 
this case, compared to when they are able to rate the faces one-by-one (Geiselman, Haight & 
Kimata, 1984; Wedell et al., 1986). 
Assimilation in Affective Responses 
Assimilation happens in affective responses, too, not only in cognitive responses. There 
are two ways affect can assimilate. One way is through valence, meaning that your pleasant 
emotion at this moment makes everything you do more enjoyable. As I will explain in the next 
section, affect priming (Bower, 1981) is a main factor leading to valence assimilation. The other 
way is arousal-based, e.g., listening to hyper rock & roll music makes you feel excited and 
powerful. This can be further explained through the excitation transfer paradigm (Zillmann, 
1971). 
Valence-based affective assimilation 
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Affect Priming 
Like judging Donald as more ferocious after priming the exemplar of Alice Cooper, 
affect priming occurs when people judge something as more enjoyable when they are in a good 
mood. Such affect priming is accomplished by specific memory nodes. According to Bower 
(1981), the major feelings (happiness, anger, etc.) we have are related to specific memory nodes, 
which can be activated by a certain event, and this will further lead to the activation of other 
connected nodes. As a result, watching a hilarious TV commercial will activate memory nodes 
for happy memories. This process affects the later evaluation of another ad in that people devote 
more attention to the funny elements if there are any, which makes people feel the two 
commercials are emotionally similar (Faseur & Geuens, 2013). 
Arousal-based affective assimilation 
Excitation transfer paradigm  
The excitation transfer paradigm holds that residual excitation from a preceding situation 
can combine with the excitation produced in a subsequent, unrelated situation, thereby creating 
an over-intense response to the subsequent stimulus (Cantor & Zillmann, 1973; Cantor, Bryant, 
& Zillmann, 1974; Cantor, Mody, & Zillmann, 1974; Cantor, Zillmann, & Bryant, 1975; 
Zillmann & Bryant, 1974). Noticeably, such transference is more likely to take place when a 
short period is left between two events. For example, Mattes and Cantor (1982) tested the effect 
of arousing prior stimuli on responses to commercials. In their experiment, they showed 
participants one of four segments of TV programing representing different levels of arousal, and 
after the segments five commercials in a row (with a 15 second pause between each commercial 
for participants to fill out the rating form). Results showed that there was no enhancement of 
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responses to the first and second commercials after the arousing programing. However, the 
excitation transfer effect began to appear at the third commercial. The commercials shown third 
and fourth revealed significantly greater enjoyment and perceived effectiveness ratings in the 
high arousal than in the low arousal conditions. The authors said the reason is that excitation can 
intensify subsequent emotional feelings only when it is not perceived as attributable to its actual 
source. 
Above all, one possibility when people evaluate two print ads jointly is that people’s 
evaluations of two print ads will assimilate toward each other. Such assimilation can be 
interactively caused by both cognitive and affective factors. In the present study, I expected that 
the ambiguity of the comparison standard rather than small distance is more likely to bring 
assimilation, from the cognitive perspective, since the two ads I used as stimuli to cause 
assimilation are from different product types, there is no direct comparison between ads. As a 
result, when people are rating the second ad they have the tendency to distort the rating towards 
the first one, and then assimilation takes place. Affect priming may cause assimilation in the 
present study as well, as the good or bad feeling people received from the first piece of 
information will influence how people process subsequent information.  
II.  Contrast 
Contrast effects are essentially the opposite of assimilation effects. A contrast effect 
means that the perceptual difference between two stimuli is greater than it really is. This effect 
occurs via cognitive and affective processes, too.  
Contrast in Cognitive Responses 
Classic contrast 
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When the difference between the test subject and the context is clear enough to be 
recognized, people tend to exaggerate this difference, thus perceiving the test subject and the 
context as more different than they really are. This is classic contrast (Helmholtz, 1866/1962), 
which posits that as a general principle, clearly perceived sensory differences tend to be 
exaggerated.  
Conversely to the idea that small distance leads to assimilation, large distance and clearly 
sensed difference results in contrast. This explains why, in Figure 1, the middle circle in the 
middle set of circles is perceived as smaller than the middle circle in the left set. In the middle 
pair of circles, the outer ring is sufficiently far away from the inner one so that people can never 
look at the two rings within one foveal view. That is, when the inner and outer rings are seen 
only in successive glances, the large distance leads to a more clearly sensed difference. And 
when two objects’ difference can be clearly sensed people have the tendency to exaggerate this 
difference. As a result, the initial judgment of the contrast portion of the configuration (the 
central circle in the middle) was significantly smaller than the initial judgment of the control 
circle (one circle on the right), t (18) = 5.61, p < .01; and the initial judgment of assimilation 
portion (the central circle on the left) is significantly larger than the control circle, t (18) = 3.24, 
p < .01 (Girgus & Coren, 1982, pp. 557-558). 
A larger distance between two positions in communication leads to contrast effects, too. 
When the distance between a person’s own stance and the position advocated in the 
communication increases, contrast takes place (Sherif & Hovland, 1961). The greater the 
distance is, the greater the perceived displacement away from the subject’s position.  
The Adaptation-Level theory  
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Another explanation for contrast effects is the adaption-level (AL) theory (Helson, 1964). 
As mentioned above, there is no context-free judgment. People make all judgments in relation to 
their current context. Therefore, when people are trying to make a judgment about a subject, 
instead of taking the absolute value, people take the AL as the zero point. Let’s go back to the 
weight lifting example. After lifting a 200-pound weight, people adapt to that current weight and 
unconsciously set that current weight as a new zero point. After this, when people are lifting a 
100-pound weight, they judge the weight according to the zero point they have just set based on 
the 200-pound weight, so that they judge it as of negative value, and although the 100-pound 
weight is still very heavy, they judge it as much lighter than 100-pounds since they are using the 
200-pound weight instead of the real zero point as the compare level (Helson, 1973). 
Contrast Effect in Affective Responses  
Hedonic contrast 
In affective responses, contrast refers to the perceived difference in pleasantness—the 
hedonic contrast, meaning that the test stimuli are rated as less good following very good context 
stimuli than when presented either alone or following neutral context stimuli (Zellner et al, 
2002). 
Consider, for example, a study in which participants tasted juice (Zellner, Allen, Henley, 
& Parker, 2006). Experimenters set full-strength juice as the positive hedonic level, and diluted 
juice as neutral. They then let one group of participants taste the full strength first and then the 
diluted ones; and the other group only drink the diluted ones. Then participants were asked to 
rate the pleasantness of the juices. People who drank the full-strength juice gave the diluted juice 
lower ratings than those who only tasted the diluted juices. In a similar example, people who 
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viewed very attractive (highly hedonically positive) tropical birds’ photos gave lower ratings of 
attractiveness to normal birds (weakly hedonically positive) than those who only viewed the 
normal birds (Zellner et al., 2003) 
The explanation of hedonic contrast effects is different from that of other contrast effects. 
Take weight lifting for instance: the reason people feel the contrast effect is an adaptation-like 
process, in which physical functions are recalibrated in the presence of a different context. 
However, for hedonic contrast, the amount of pleasantness does not correspond with the amount 
of some physical entity stimulating some sensory channel.  
One possible explanation for the hedonic contrast is that there are hedonic control 
systems in place to protect us from experiencing too much pleasure or displeasure. One of these 
systems is the opponent-process theory of motivation (Solomon, 1980). This theory proposes that 
extreme pleasantness or unpleasantness disrupts equilibrium, causing the body to produce an 
opposite hedonic tone that reduces the initial pleasant or unpleasant experience. This may 
explain why after having “positive hedonic level” juice participants felt the following “neutral 
hedonic level” juice tasted worse than people who only rated the “neutral hedonic level” juice. A 
negative response can neutralize the positive response so that people can maintain their 
emotional equilibrium. 
Above all, in comparison to assimilation effects, contrast effects in both cognitive and 
affective studies support the hypothesis that the two commercials will act as comparison 
standards for each other, and the discrepancy between them will be expanded. In the present 
study, the clearly sensed difference may bring about contrast (Girgus & Coren, 1982), since 
when participants saw two ads clearly different in argument strength they would exaggerate the 
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difference (Helmholtz, 1886/1962; Stapel et al., 1997). The hedonic contrast is expected to cause 
contrast effect in the current study, too. Viewing and rating the bad ad after a good ad featuring 
the same product may be like tasting the watered down juice after the non-diluted fully-hedonic 
juice. People will contrast their feeling and thus rate the bad ad even worse. 
Product Categories 
Two other variables are taken into consideration in the present study. One is the product 
category. It is suggested that whether assimilation or contrast effects will emerge is strongly 
influenced by the conceptual similarity between the test component and the context (Coren & 
Enns, 1993). For example, objects that belong to the same category (e.g., two humans) more 
readily invite comparison processes than do objects that belong to dissimilar categories (e.g., 
people and animals; Staple & Winkielman, 1998). 
Specifically, in order that comparisons occur between stimuli and context, they must be 
sufficiently similar (Coren & Enns, 1993; Parducci, Knoble & Thomas, 1953; Zellner et al., 
2002). Therefore, for stimuli from the same product category, a contrast effect is more readily 
invited. As Brown (1953, p.210) said, only when the context is categorized as in the same group 
with the target stimuli, will the context serve as a comparison standard for the target stimuli. On 
the other hand, for stimuli from different product categories, there is no sufficient comparable 
relevance between the stimuli and the context. People therefore assimilate their judgments and 
integrate them in this situation (Stapel et al, 1997). According to Hovland and Sherif (1961), 
when the difference between the context and the stimulus is within a certain range, then there is 
assimilation; as long as the differences are sufficiently large, then there is contrast. There is a 
particular boundary when the difference is such that there is no assimilation or contrast, but as 
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long as the difference exceeds it, people’s judgments change from assimilation to contrast. In the 
present study, through pretesting I found that there was a significant difference in people’s liking 
and persuasiveness ratings between the good and bad ads within and across the product 
categories, and there was no significant difference between good ads across product category 
(The process and result of the pretests will be further explained in the following part.). Therefore, 
I hypothesized the following: 
H1: When people see two ads from different product categories, they will rate the ad with 
strong arguments as less likeable and persuasive and the ad with weak arguments more likable 
and persuasive, compared to when people only see one ad, as an effect of assimilation. 
H2: When people see two ads from the same product category, they will rate the ad with 
strong arguments as more likeable and persuasive, and the ad with weak arguments less likable 
and persuasive, compared to when people only see one ad, as an effect of contrast. 
Order of Presentation  
The other variable considered in the present study is the order of presentation. It is 
assumed that to change the order in which the two ads are presented will affect people’s 
judgment towards each ad. For example, Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) examined how presenting 
information in different orders would influence people’s final judgment towards a statement. 
Specifically, in one of their experiments, they asked participants to rate an original statement, 
and then provided them with one piece of positive additional information, which was supposed 
to increase people’s belief of the original statement; and a piece of negative additional 
information, which was supposed to decrease people’s belief of the original statement. They 
manipulated that one group of participants received the additional information in positive-
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negative order, while the other in negative-positive order. And after all the additional 
information, participants were asked again to rate how much they believed the original statement 
was true. Results showed that people in positive-negative group obtained an overall lower belief 
in the original statement. According to the authors, this is one illustration of the anchoring-and-
adjustment model. The underlying purpose of adjusting beliefs to the impact of new evidence is 
adaptation. The adaptation weight, therefore, should depend on both the impact of the new 
information and on the anchor (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). 
The order of presentation has been researched in advertising studies, too. For example, 
previous researchers (Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994) have stated that the presentation order of 
advertising information would affect consumers’ information processing. They proposed this 
would occur due to primacy and recency effects. The primacy effect refers to previous 
information exhibiting greater effect than subsequent information, whereas the recency effect 
refers to subsequent information having a greater effect than earlier information (Brunel & 
Nelson, 2003; Curtis & Duane, 1994). Research on primacy and recency in advertising generally 
shows that, if people encounter two opposing advertising messages for a product, people’s 
judgements are more consistent with the first piece message when involvement is high, and their 
judgements are more consistent with the second (opposing) message when involvement is low 
(Lana, 1963).  
Unlike previous research focusing on primacy or recency in the order of presentation 
effects (e.g., Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994; Hovland, 1957; Lana, 1963; Miller & Campbell, 
1957; Shanteau, 1970), in the present study I focused on that for each ad, if I changed its position 
from the first to the second in the sequence, how this would impact people’s response towards it. 
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Hogarth and Einhorn’s anchoring-and-adjustment model (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992) lays a solid 
foundation for the current study. They showed that the response of the new piece of information 
does not only depend on the information itself, but depends on previous information, i.e., the 
anchor. Therefore, although people process the same two pieces of information, the order of 
presentation decides where people set the anchor and how the other piece of information 
influence the anchor that is set. Therefore, different final judgments towards each piece of 
information should be provided.  Furthermore, there was no previous research focusing on how 
changing the order from A-B to B-A might affect people’s response towards each piece of 
information. It is hard here to hypothesize the direction of how either attitude or persuasiveness 
will change, so in the current study I will leave it as a research question. 
Research Question 1: Will people who see two ads in a different order of presentation 
rate the two ads differently? 
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CHAPTER 3. METHOD 
Pretests and Stimulus 
Stimuli were chosen on the basis of pretest results, which were conducted to make sure 
that (a) people’s involvement for good/bad ads across product types are of the same levels, (b) 
there were significant differences between the good and the bad ads within both orange juice and 
facial tissue ads, and that (c) there are no significant differences between the good orange juice 
and the good facial tissue ads, or the bad orange juice and the bad facial tissue ads. After six 
separate individual pretests, we got the results that almost fulfill the objective of the pretests. 58 
participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) participated in the final pretest for a 
payment of $ 0.30 US. They were randomly assigned to four groups in which only one of the 
four ads (a good facial tissue ad, a good orange juice ad, a bad facial tissue ad and a bad orange 
juice ad) was shown to them. They were asked to view the ad and answer questions about 
involvement, liking and persuasiveness towards the ads. 
The reason to measure involvement for the ads is that I wanted to check that in the 
present study involvement was not a variable. Since involvement could play a role in affecting 
people’s responses towards the arguments (Petty & Cacioppo,1984), I had to make sure that the 
orange juice and the facial tissue products were of the same level of involvement for participants. 
Results showed no significant differences between good (M good orange juice = 4.23, SD good orange juice 
= 1.54; M good facial tissue = 4.37, SD good facial tissue = .88; t (26) = -.32, p = .76) and bad ads (M bad 
orange juice = 4.88, SD bad orange juice = 1.63; M bad facial tissue = 4.54, SD bad orange juice = 1.52; t (28) = .95, 
p = .56) across product types.  
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Independent samples t-test results showed that in orange juice group, the good (M = 5.14, 
SD = 1.00) and the bad (M = 4.05, SD = 1.66) ads were significantly different on liking, t (25) = 
2.06, p < .05; there was marginally significant result between the two ads (M good = 5.23, SD good 
= 1.04; M bad = 3.98, SD bad = 2.07) in persuasiveness, t (25) = 1.96, p = .06. For facial tissue ads, 
there were significant differences between good and bad ads in both liking (M good = 4.75, SD good 
= .87; M bad = 3.64, SD bad = 1.48), t (29) = 2.52, p < .05, and persuasiveness (M good = 4.89, SD 
good = .96; M bad = 3.71, SD bad = 1.86), t (29) = 2.20, p < .05. Also, as expected, there were no 
significant differences between good orange juice (M liking= 5.14, SD liking = 1.00; M persuasiveness = 
5.23, SD persuasiveness = 1.04) and good facial tissue (M liking = 4.75, SD liking= .88; M persuasiveness = 
4.89, SD persuasiveness = .96) ads in liking (t (26) = 1.10, p = .28) or persuasiveness (t (26) = .906, p 
= .373). There was no significant difference between bad orange juice (M liking= 4.32, SD liking = 
1.77; M persuasiveness = 3.98, SD persuasiveness = 2.07) and bad facial tissue (M liking= 3.64, SD liking = 
1.48; M persuasiveness = 3.71, SD persuasiveness = 1.86) ads in liking (t (28) = 1.148, p = .26) or 
persuasiveness (t (28) = .37, p = .71) either.  
Design 
The main experiment was a 2 (product category: same v. different) x 2 (order of 
presentation: good first v. bad first) x 2 (ad quality: good v. bad) x (2 (ad: first ad v. second ad)) 
mixed design experiment; the last variable, ad, was a repeated measure. Product category and 
order of presentation were manipulated between participants. Additionally, there was a set of 
control conditions where participants were randomly assigned to evaluate one of the four ads 
individually in a separate, but simultaneously run two-way factorial design experiment, a 2 (ad 
persuasiveness: good v. bad) x 2 (product type: orange juice v. facial tissue). I expected no main 
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effects or interaction effects on this separate experiment; these scores served as comparison 
points for the evaluations in the other conditions. 
Assimilation and contrast effects could be seen by comparing the difference between 
pairs of ads in the control conditions, where participants saw only one ad, and the difference 
between pairs of ads in the experimental conditions, where participants saw two ads. 
Assimilation effects would be observed when the difference between control conditions was 
greater than the difference between experimental conditions (i.e., the ads seemed more similar in 
experimental conditions than in control). Contrast effects would be observed when the difference 
between control conditions was smaller than the difference between experimental conditions 
(i.e., the ads seemed more different in experimental conditions than in control).  
Participants and Procedure 
Four hundred and ninety Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers participated in this 
study for payment of $0.30 US. They were told they would provide some evaluations for some 
print ads as the purpose of study. Each participant accepted the Human Intelligence Task (HIT) 
on MTurk, and started to take the experiment. They viewed one ad (in control groups) or two ads 
(in experimental groups). After viewing all the ads, they are asked that how much they liked the 
ads and how persuasive they thought the ads were on 7-point scales from strongly disagree (1) to 
strongly agree (7). Previous research showed that when statements used in the experiment are 
short and simple, to measure people’s response after they process all the information is more 
widely adopted (e.g. Allen & Feldman, 1974; Anderson, 1973a, 1973b; Asch, 1946). So in the 
present study I adopted this measurement process too. 
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The entire task lasted approximately 5 minutes. When data collection was completed, 
each participant typed in a survey code for remuneration. At the end of the questionnaire, all 
participants were asked whether they had participated in any pretests of the same study on Mturk 
before, and the answers from those who reported yes (N = 14) were deleted from the analyses. 
Dependent Variables and Measurement 
As mentioned above, both affect and cognition are important properties of attitudes, 
(Crites et al., 1994). People not only think about whether an ad is persuasive, but also about 
whether they like it or not. I therefore measured people’s responses towards the ads on the liking 
and persuasiveness scales. 
Liking. I measured liking by asking participants to rate five items on seven-point scales, 
with 1 equal to “strongly disagree” and 7 “strongly agree.” Items include (a) I dislike the ad (r), 
(b) The ad is appealing to me, (c) The ad is attractive to me, (d) The ad is interesting to me, and 
(e) I think the ad is bad (r). In the present study the alpha was .93, which was consistent with 
earlier research by Lee and Mason (1999) who reported an alpha of .91, and by Kim, Haley and 
Koo (2009) with an alpha of .95. 
Persuasiveness. The same as the liking scale, participants were asked to rate three items 
on seven-point scales, including (a) I believe it is a good product, (b) The information given is 
very compelling, and (c) The information is persuasive. The alpha for the present study was .91, 
consistent with the earlier research by White and Peloza (2009) with alpha equaled .88. 
Cronbach’s Alpha for all items including the four items under liking and the three items under 
persuasiveness was .94. 
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
 In control groups, results showed significant differences between the good and the bad 
orange juice ads in liking (M good orange juice = 5.64, SD good orange juice = 1.00; M bad orange juice = 4.05, SD bad orange 
juice = 1.66, t (75) = 5.08, p < .001) as well as persuasiveness ((M good orange juice = 5.51, SD good orange juice 
= .98; M bad orange juice = 3.84, SD bad orange juice = 1.64, t (75) = 5.38, p < .001). Results also showed 
significant differences between the good and the bad facial tissue ads in liking (M good facial tissue = 
4.84, SD good facial tissue = 1.26; M bad facial tissue = 3.91, SD bad facial tissue = 1.39, t (76) = 3.13, p < .005) and 
persuasiveness (M good facial tissue = 4.98, SD good facial tissue = 1.06; M bad facial tissue = 4.00, SD bad orange juice = 1.33, t 
(76) = 3.62, p < .005). I expected no significant differences between good ads (or bad ads) across 
the product types. This was true for bad ads. No significant differences were found between the 
bad orange juice ad and the bad facial tissue ads in liking (t (74) = .41, p = .68) and 
persuasiveness (t (74) = -.448, p = .66). But contrary to what was expected, there were 
significant differences between the good orange juice ad and the good facial tissue ads in liking 
(t (77) = 3.13, p < .005) and persuasiveness (t (77) = 2.27, p < .05).  
 In experimental groups, liking scores were subjected to a three-way mixed model 
ANOVA. There was a significant main effect of product type on liking scores, F (1, 297) = 6.92, 
p = .009. Orange juice ads (M = 4.91, SD = 1.10) were rated significantly higher than the facial 
tissue ads (M = 4.56, SD = 1.22), t (303) = 2.65 p < .01.  
 There was also a significant ad (within) by order (between) interaction, F (1, 297) = 
180.30, p <.001. As can be seen in Figure 2, good ads were always rated significantly more 
likeable and persuasive than bad ads. Paired samples t-tests showed, on the left side of Figure 2, 
a preference for good ads for people who saw good and then bad, t (157) = 9.64, p < .001; and on 
the right side of Figure 2, a preference for good ads for people who saw bad then good, t (147) = 
21 
 
 
-9.43, p < .001. And independent samples t-tests showed that people rated the first ad higher if it 
was good (M = 5.46, SD = 1.31) than if it was bad (M = 4.20, SD = 1.62), t (303) = 7.48, p 
< .001; likewise, people rated the second ad higher if it was good (M = 5.48, SD = 1.21) than if it 
was bad (M = 3.83, SD = 1.79), t (303) = -9.28, p < .001.  
 Next I compared the outside bars in Figure 2: Liking scores toward the good ads did not 
depend on whether they were seen first (M = 5.46, SD = 1.31), or second (M = 5.48, SD = 1.21), 
t (303) = 0.14, p = 0.89. Finally, I compared the inside bars in Figure 2: Liking scores toward the 
bad ads differed slightly, depending on whether they were seen first (M = 4.20, SD = 1.62) or 
second (M = 3.83, SD = 1.79), t (303) = 1.84, p = .07. 
 Taken as a whole, this ad by order interaction suggests that bad ads might be rated more 
harshly when they are seen after a good ad, compared to when they are seen before a good ad. 
However, this effect was not statistically significant.  
 Between subjects there was a marginally significant order by category interaction, F (1, 
297) = 3.81, p = .052. As can be seen on the left side of Figure 4, ratings of the two ads in the 
good ad first order do not depend on whether they are from the same (M = 4.78, SD = 1.09) or 
different (M = 4.54, SD = 1.23) product types, t (155) = 1.29, p = .20; likewise, on the right side 
of Figure 3, ratings of the two ads in bad first order do not depend on whether they are from the 
same (M = 4.7, SD = 1.08) or different (M = 4.97, SD = 1.24) product types, either, t (146) = 
1.41, p = .16. Next I compared the ads from the same product category in different presentation 
orders: Liking scores towards the ads did not depend on whether the two ads are shown in good 
first (M = 4.78, SD = 1.09) or bad first (M = 4.7, SD = 1.08) orders, t (147) = .45, p = .65; 
However, for ads from different product types, liking scores towards ads differed significantly 
depending on whether ads are shown in good first (M = 4.54, SD = 1.23) or bad first (M = 4.97, 
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SD = 1.24) order, t (154) = 2.17, p = .03.  
 Taken as a whole, this order by category interaction suggests that ratings of the two ads 
from different product categories are higher in bad-good order than in good-bad order.  
 As mentioned there was a significant ad by order interaction (F (1, 297) = 180.30, p 
<.001). And this ad by order interaction was qualified by an ad by order by category three-way 
interaction, F (1, 297) = 7.14, p < .01. In order to better understand this three-way interaction, I 
first decomposed it into two two-way interactions: an ad by order interaction for participants who 
saw two ads for the same product, F (1, 147) = 120.82, p < .001; and an ad by order interaction 
for participants who saw two ads from different product categories, F (1, 154) = 63.55, p < .001. 
First, I will consider the same product interaction. 
 As can be seen in Figure 4(a), good ads were always rated significantly better than bad 
ads. Paired samples t-tests showed, on the left side of Figure 4(a), a preference for good ads for 
people who saw good and then bad, t (75) = 7.96, p < .001; and on the right side of Figure 3(a), a 
preference for good ads for people who saw bad then good, t (72) = -7.71, p < .001. And 
independent samples t-test showed that people rated the first ad higher if it was good than if it 
was bad, t (147) = 8.11, p < .001; likewise, people rated the second ad higher if it was good than 
if it was bad, t (152) = 6.71, p < .001. 
 Next I compared the outside bars in Figure 4(a): Liking toward the good ads did not 
depend on whether they were seen first (M = 5.75, SD = 1.19), or second (M = 5.47, SD = 1.21), 
t (147) = 1.11, p = .27. Finally, I compared the inside bars in Figure 3(a): Liking toward the bad 
ads did not depend on whether they were seen first (M = 3.94, SD = 1.52), or second (M = 3.8, 
SD = 1.79) either, t (152) = 0.52, p = .6.  
 Taken as a whole, this two-way interaction shows that when people see two ads from the 
23 
 
 
same product type, they rate the good and bad ads consistently, regardless of whether good 
comes first or bad comes first.  
 Next, I consider the ad by order interaction for participants who saw two ads from 
different product categories. As shown in Figure 4(b), good ads were always rated significantly 
better than bad ads. Paired samples t-tests showed, on the left side of Figure 4(b), a preference 
for good ads for people who saw good then bad, t (80) = 5.77, p < .001; and on the right side, a 
preference for good ads for people who saw bad then good, t (74) = -5.67, p < .001. And 
independent samples t-tests showed that people rated the first ad higher if it was good than if it 
was bad, t (154) = 3.01, p = .003; likewise, people rated the second ad higher if it was good than 
if it was bad, t (154) = 6.49, p < .001. 
 Then I compared the outside bars in Figure 4(b): Liking scores towards the good ads 
didn’t depend on whether they were seen first (M = 5.19, SD = 1.37), or second (M = 5.49, SD = 
1.21), t (154) = 1.45, p = .15. Finally, I compared the inside bars in Figure 3(b): Liking scores 
towards the bad ads differed significantly, depending on whether they were seen first (M = 4.45, 
SD = 1.69), or second (M = 3.89, SD = 1.79), t (154) = 2.01, p = .047.  
 Taken as a whole, this ad by order interaction when two ads are from different product 
categories suggests that when participants viewed the bad ad after a good ad, they rated the bad 
ad more harshly. 
Persuasiveness  
 There was a main ad effect within subjects, F (1, 297) = 9.96, p = .022. People rated the 
first ad (M = 4.83, SD = 1.64) as more persuasive than the second ad (M = 4.53, SD = 1.74), t 
(608) = 2.15, p = .03. There was also a significant product type main effect, F (1, 297) = 8.53, p 
= .004. People rated the orange juice ads (M = 4.86, SD = 1.07) as more persuasive than the 
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facial tissue ads (M = 4.49, SD = 1.10), t (303) = 2.92, p < .01. 
 There was a significant ad by order interaction, F (1, 297) = 217.84, p < .001. As can be 
seen in Figure 5, good ads were always rated as more persuasive than bad ads. Paired samples t-
tests showed higher persuasiveness ratings for good ads for people who saw good and then bad, t 
(156) = 11.609, p < .001; and bad then good, t (147) = -9.026, p < .001. Independent samples t-
test showed that people rated the first ad as more persuasive if it was good than if it was bad, t 
(303) = 8.33, p < .001; likewise, people rated the second ad as more persuasive if it was good 
than if it was bad, t (303) = 11.23, p < .001. 
 Next I compared the outside bars in Figure 5: persuasiveness ratings of the good ads did 
not depend on whether they were seen first (M = 5.51, SD = 1.22) or second (M= 5.5, SD = 
1.17), t (303) = .07, p = .94. Finally, I compared the inside bars in Figure 5: persuasiveness 
ratings of the bad ads differed significantly, depending on whether they were seen first (M = 4.1, 
SD = 1.71) or second (M = 3.62, SD = 1.69), t (303) = 2.46, p = .01.  
 Taken as a whole, the ad by order interaction suggests that bad ads might be rated as 
being less persuasive when they are seen after a good ad than before a good ad.  
 This ad by order interaction was qualified by an ad by order by category three-way 
interaction, F (1, 297) = 8.17, p < .01. I further decomposed it into two two-way interactions: an 
ad by order interaction for who saw two ads from the same product, F (1, 147) = 289.08, p 
< .001; and ad by order interaction for participants who saw two ads from different product 
categories, F (1, 154) = 138.29, p < .001. First, I considered the same product situation.  
 As can be seen in Figure 6(a), good ads were rated significantly more persuasive than bad 
ads. Paired samples t-tests showed higher persuasiveness ratings for good ads for people who 
saw both good then bad order, t (75) = 9.73, p < .001, and bad then good order, t (72) = -6.95, p 
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< .001. Independent samples t-tests showed that people rated the first ad as being more 
persuasive if it was good than if it was bad, t (147) = 7.98, p < .001; likewise, people rated the 
second ad as being more persuasive if it was good than if it was bad, t (147) = -8.70, p < .001. 
Outside bars in Figure 6(a) showed that liking scores towards the good ads didn’t depend on 
whether they were seen first (M = 5.74, SD = 1.08) or second (M = 5.51, SD = 1.21), t (147) = 
1.23, p = .22. And inside bars in Figure 6(a) showed that liking scores towards the bad ads 
differed slightly, depending on whether they were seen first (M = 3.90, SD = 1.68) or second (M 
= 3.4, SD = 1.7), t (147) = 1.81, p = .07.  
 Second, I consider the ad by order interaction for participants who saw two ads from 
different product types. As can be seen in Figure 6(b), good ads were always rated significantly 
more persuasive than bad ads. Paired t-tests showed higher persuasiveness ratings for good ads 
in good then bad, t (80) = 6.94, p < .001, and in bad then good orders, t (74) = 5.81, p < .001. 
Independent samples t-tests also showed that people rated the first or second ad as being more 
persuasive if it was good than if it was bad, t (154) = 4.13, p < .001, and t (154) = 7.21, p < .001 
respectively. Then I compared the outside bars in Figure 6(b): persuasiveness ratings of the good 
ads didn’t depend on whether they were seen first (M = 5.30, SD = 1.31) or second (M = 5.49, 
SD = 1.15), t (154) = 0.96, p = .34. Finally, the inside bars showed that persuasiveness ratings of 
the bad ads differ slightly, depending on whether they were seen first (M = 4.29, SD = 1.73) or 
second (M = 3.83, SD = 1.66), t (154) = 1.69, p = .09.  
 Overall this ad by order interaction when two ads from different product categories 
suggests that bad ads might be rated more harshly when they are seen after a good ad than before 
a good ad.  
Contrast and Assimilation Effects 
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As shown in Table 1, I compared the mean differences of the two ads in the two-ad 
situation and in the one-ad situation. I analyzed the differences between ads here for that both 
comparison and assimilation are actually about the perceptual differences between the stimuli 
and its context—whether they increase or decrease (Sherif & Hovland, 1961). For example, I 
compared the mean difference of the good and bad orange juice ads’ liking scores in two-ad 
situation, and I got 1.76 (SD = .78) and 1.75 (SD = .60) as mean differences in good-bad and 
bad-good sequence, respectively; and I calculated the mean difference of the two same ads that 
were viewed in the one-ad situation, which was 1.59 (SD = .62). I then compared the mean 
differences (t good-first = .16, p = .87; t bad-first = .16, p = .87). I expected that when the two ads were 
from the same product category, the difference in the two-ad conditions should be larger than in 
the one-ad conditions (as was shown in the example above), since people have a tendency to 
exaggerate the difference between two attitude objects (i.e., show evidence of a contrast effect) 
when the two ads are directly comparable. On the other hand, if the two ads are from different 
product categories, (e.g., orange juice ad and facial tissue ad) the difference between the two ads 
should become less obvious, and people may lose the immediate comparison standard (i.e., show 
evidence of an assimilation effect). For the Hypothesis 1, all results were in the right directions, 
meaning that the differences between the good and bad ads from the same product category are 
larger in the two-ad situations than in one-ad situation. However, as shown in Table 1, no 
significant results were found. For assimilation effects (H2), however, two out of the eight 
groups’ results didn’t follow the expected pattern. They are the liking and persuasiveness results 
for the good facial tissue ad and the bad orange juice ad group. Contracting the hypothesis, in 
these two groups, people rated the two ads from different product categories as more different 
from each other in the two-ad situations (M liking = 1.32, SD liking = 0.71; M persuasiveness = 1.71, SD 
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persuasiveness = 0.62) than in the one-ad situation (M liking = 0.79, SD liking = 0.65; M persuasiveness = 1.14, 
SD persuasiveness = 0.61). Still, no significant results were found in assimilation groups. A graphical 
representation of the mean differences is presented in Figures 7 and 8. 
Order of Presentation 
Last I tested how the ad order would affect people’s liking and persuasiveness scores 
towards the ads. I wanted to test when people see two ads in different orders they will give each 
ad different scores (R1). Tables 2 and 3 summarize how order influenced participants’ ratings of 
the ads. As shown in the tables, only three out of sixteen t-test groups showed significant results, 
which are the liking (t (69) = 2.95, p < .005) and persuasiveness (t (69) = 2.19, p < .05) of the 
facial tissue ad when shown with an ad from the same product type, and the persuasiveness of 
the good orange juice ad when displayed with an ad from a different product type, t (76) = 2.28, 
p < .05. There is also a marginally significant result for persuasiveness of the bad orange juice ad 
when shown with an ad from a different product type, t (76) = 1.88, p = .06. In these groups, 
participants rated the ads significantly differently based on which position the ad is in the order, 
but there was no consistent direction of at which position the ad was rated higher than the other: 
as can be seen in Tables 2 and 3, in two of them the first ads were rated higher, and in the other 
one the second ad was rated higher. However, t- tests of other 12 groups showed no significant 
results. Therefore, overall for the answer of R1, the order of presentation didn’t influence 
people’s response towards each piece of information in the sequence. A noticeable result, as 
shown above, was that overall the order of presentation didn’t make in difference in good ads’ 
scores, meaning that people give the same scores to the good ad no matter whether they are 
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shown at the first place or second. However, bad ads are rated more harshly when they are seen 
after good ads than before good ads. 
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 
This study aimed to examine (a) the assimilation and contrast in people’s judgments 
towards ads given the two ads are from different or same product types, and (b) the influence of 
the order of presentation on people’s judgments towards each ad.  
Albeit no significant difference, results were in the same directions as I expected for the 
contrast and assimilation effects. First, when people see two ads from the same product type, 
they contrasted their judgments towards the ads. They rated the good ad as more likable and 
persuasive and the bad ad less likable and persuasive compared to the one-ad situation, where 
people rated the ads individually. Second, when people see two ads from different product types, 
despite the two inconsistent mean difference scores—the liking and the persuasiveness of the 
good facial tissue and the bad orange juice ad— people assimilate their judgments, and thus rated 
the good ad lower in liking and persuasiveness and the bad ad higher in liking and 
persuasiveness, compared to the one-ad situation, where people rated the ads individually. For 
the order of presentation, people did not tend to rate the ads differently depending on the orders 
in which they were shown.  
Specifically, for the contrast effect analysis, most results provide weak support for the 
hypotheses. This is consistent with results from previous studies showing that when there is 
enough similarity between context and the stimulus, contrast effects are more readily invited 
(Brown, 1953; Coren & Enns, 1993). Interestingly, as was mentioned above, when there is 
clearly sensed difference, people have a tendency to exaggerate it. However, such “clearly 
sensed difference” only happens when people categorize the two ads as from the same product 
type. That is, for ads from the different product types, it seems that there should be an even 
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bigger difference between the two ads, as they are actually featuring different products. 
However, as people don’t really categorize them as from the same product type, the two ads 
become no longer directly comparable, thus the contrast effect no longer exists, and assimilation 
effects take place.  
In the assimilation effect analyses, there is an inconsistent difference in the group of good 
facial tissue ad and the bad orange juice ad when the ads are shown in the good-first order. If it is 
consistent with the hypothesis, the difference between these two ads should be smaller in the 
two-ad situation, where people see two ads one by one, than in the one-ad situation where people 
see two ads individually. A possible explanation is that, as shown in the overall result part, for 
both liking and persuasiveness results, there are ad by order (mixed, within- and between- 
subjects) interaction effects showing that bad ads are rated more harshly when they are seen after 
the good ads, especially when the two ads are from different product types. As a result, when 
people viewed a good facial tissue ad and a bad orange juice ad in the good-first order, the bad 
orange juice was rated much more harshly. And the difference between the two ads are enlarged 
due to the low scores of the bad orange juice ad, and thus nullifying the expected assimilation 
effect.  
For the order of presentation effect, a noticeable result is that the order influences 
people’s judgments towards the bad ads much more than good ads. People believe that the bad 
ads following good ads are particularly bad compared with those preceding good ads. In other 
words, seeing a bad ad before a good ad didn’t make people believe that the good ad as better; 
however, seeing a good ad before a bad ad makes people believe the bad ad is much worse. Part 
of this is in line with the positive-negative asymmetry effect in the field of impression formation 
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(e.g., Anderson, 1962, 1965), which means that in general, negative information receives more 
processing and contributes more strongly to the final impression than does positive information, 
and that learning something bad about a new acquaintance carries more weight than learning 
something good (Baumeister & Bratslavsky, 2001; Larsen, Smith & Cacioppo, 1998; Taylor, 
1991). However, there is also an order asymmetry, meaning that in the present study, such a 
positive-negative asymmetry only happens in the good-then-bad order. This is consistent with 
the Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) study showing that the larger the positive anchor, the more an 
opposite-meaning piece of information will drag down the anchor. In the present study, this 
means that when a good ad will set a higher anchor in people’s judgment, the bad ad would drag 
down people’s rating of the good ad more badly.  
Some other interesting results stand out across the overall main and interaction effects. 
First, people’s responses are reflected in both cognitive and affective aspects, which are 
measured in “persuasiveness” and “liking” scales in the current study. In the current study, liking 
questions were all about the ads, and persuasiveness questions were about the product and the 
information. As mentioned, an alpha of .94 was reported for all items. I have labeled these scales 
as liking and persuasiveness, but they could also be conceived as attitudes towards the 
product/information in the ads and combined into a single measure. Basically, they shared the 
same patterns; for example, an ad by order within- and between- subject interaction effect is 
found in both liking and persuasiveness results, meaning that people rate good ads better than 
bad ads. Such interactions are both qualified by whether the two ads are from the same product 
type or different product types. Besides, people believed that the orange juice ads are better than 
the facial tissue ads in both liking and persuasiveness scales. However, there are discrepancies. 
For example, there is a main within-subject effect of ad that only happens in persuasiveness: 
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overall people believe that the first ad is more persuasive than the second ad. This is possibly 
because that in the current study, stimuli were manipulated more in the persuasiveness aspect 
than in the liking aspect. For example, in the good and bad orange juices ads, the same orange 
juice picture is used, the difference is in the argument: in the good ad says “gives you 200% of 
your vitamin C in just one serving”, and in the bad ad it says: “gives you 2% of your vitamin C 
in just one serving”. This may explain why people feel a main ad effect only in persuasiveness 
level, but not in liking. 
Second is that whether products are from the same or different product types matters. In 
both liking and persuasiveness results, the ad by order interaction was qualified by whether ads 
are from the same or different product categories. Specifically, for ads from the same product 
types, people rated the good and bad ads consistently regardless of the order of presentation. 
However, for ads from different product types, the bad ad is rated lower in the good-bad order 
than in the reverse order. A possible explanation is that when people viewed two ads from 
different product types they processed more information than when they are viewing ads from 
the same product type. Previous research has shown that when people are dealing complex 
information and when the level of involvement is low, people would process the second piece of 
information more thoroughly and thus replying more on it to generate the overall opinion (Lana, 
1963; Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994). Although I tested the responses towards each ad instead of 
the overall opinion, it makes senses to infer in this situation that when people are dealing with 
information of ads from different product types they processed the second ad, a bad ad in this 
case, more completely and focused more on the bad details (Buda & Zhang, 2000). 
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The results in the present study had a few implications for advertising placements. It 
points out to advertisers that when they are doing copy tests it is not only necessary to test 
consumers react to the ad when they see it individually. They might also want to test if they put 
the ad in a context, for example, next to an ad from the direct competitor, whether consumers 
will think differently about the ad. They might think the test ad is even better, but they might also 
think in the other way. Also, when the ad is of relatively lower quality, it is smarter to put it 
before a really good ad. Because when people see a bad ad immediately after a good one, they 
will be much less satisfied about what they are seeing.  
Limitations and future directions 
Although the present study makes a contribution to persuasiveness information 
assimilation and contrast, as well as order of presentation, there are some limitations that provide 
directions for future research. First, among the four groups of participants who only viewed one 
ad, contracting the expectation, there is significant difference between the good orange juice ad 
and the good facial tissue ad in liking results (t = 3.15, p < .05) and in persuasiveness results (t = 
2.27, p < .05): people rated the good facial tissue ad much lower than the good orange juice ad. 
This resulted in the smaller difference between the good facial tissue ads and the bad orange 
juice ads: as is shown in Figure 7(a) and 7(b), among the two bars in the right of each figure, the 
facial tissue bars (M liking = 0.79, SD liking = 0.65; M persuasiveness = 1.14, SD persuasiveness = 0.61) are 
much shorter than the orange juice bars (M liking = 1.74, SD liking = 0.56; M persuasiveness = 1.51, SD 
persuasiveness = 0.54). This may further explain that the difference between the good facial tissue ad 
and the bad orange juice ad in the one-ad situation is smaller than in the two-ad situation, which 
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is inconsistent with the assimilation hypothesis. In further research, the assimilation effect should 
have been more salient if the difference between ads in one-ad situations are better controlled. 
Furthermore, for ads used in the present study to be more similar to daily life situation, 
they should be manipulated from more dimensions instead of just the argument strength level. In 
other words, in the current study the ads only differed in how persuasive the arguments are about 
the product. But in real life it is unlikely to see two ads with the same pictures and the same 
designs only differing in the arguments. For further experiments, stimuli distinguishing in both 
design and arguments should be used to better imitate the real life situations.  
In Hogarth and Einhorn’s (1992) study, they categorize the response modes in order of 
presentation experiments into two groups: The Step-by-Step (SbS) procedure in which subjects 
are asked to express their beliefs after integrating each piece of evidence in a given sequence; 
and the End-of-Sequence (EoS) procedure where subjects only report their opinions once all the 
information has been presented. As mentioned in the method part, from previous studies it is 
shown that when statements used in the experiment are short and simple, the EoS process mode 
is more widely used (e.g. Allen & Feldman, 1974; Anderson, 1973a, 1973b; Asch, 1946), and the 
present study adopted this mode too. However, since in the present study it focused on how the 
order of presentation affected people’s responses towards each piece of information in the 
sequence, it will be interesting to see whether to change the process mode from EoS to SbS will 
bring any changes to the result in future studies. 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1. The components of Delboeuf Illusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
 
Figure 2. Ads’ Liking Scores in Good-first and Bad-first Order of Presentation 
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Figure 3. Order and Category Interaction in Liking Scores 
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Figure 4(a). Liking Scores towards Ads from Same Product Types in Different Order of Presentations 
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Figure 4(b). Liking scores towards Ads from Different Product Types in Different Order of 
Presentations 
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Figure 5. Ads’ Persuasiveness Scores in Good-first and Bad-first Order of Presentation 
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Figure 6(a). Persuasiveness towards Ads from Same Product Types in Different Order of 
Presentations 
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Figure 6(b). Persuasiveness towards Ads from Different Product Types in Different Order of 
Presentations 
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Figure 7(a). Liking Difference between Good and Bad Ads from the Same Product Type in Two-
ad and One-ad Situations  
 
 
Figure 7(b). Attitude Difference between Good and Bad Ads from Different Product Types in 
Two-ad and One-ad Situations
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Figure 8(a). Persuasiveness Difference between Good and Bad Ads from the Same Product Type 
in Two-ad and One-ad Situations 
 
 
Figure 8(b). Persuasiveness Difference between Good and Bad Ads from Different Product Types in 
Two-ad and One-ad Situations 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Liking and Persuasiveness Scores’ Differences in Two-ad and One-ad Situations 
Category Product type Numbers Order Liking 
Standard 
Error 
p Persuasiveness 
Standard 
Error 
p Elements 
same  
orange juice 
two ads 
good first 1.76 0.78 0.87 2.35 0.75 0.50 
Good Oj and Bad 
Oj 
bad first 1.75 0.60 0.87 1.93 0.68 0.79 
one ad N/A 1.59 0.62 N/A 1.66 0.62 N/A 
facial tissue 
two ads 
good first 2.16 0.62 0.21 2.32 0.62 0.14 
Good Ft and Bad 
Ft 
bad first 1.28 0.52 0.72 1.23 0.62 0.79 
one ad N/A 0.94 0.60 N/A 0.98 0.54 N/A 
different 
orange juice 
two ads 
good first 1.28 0.56 0.60 1.20 0.58 0.72 
Good Oj and Bad 
Ft 
bad first 1.30 0.49 0.61 1.44 0.55 0.93 
one ad N/A 1.74 0.56 N/A 1.51 0.54 N/A 
facial tissue 
two ads 
good first 1.32 0.71 0.61 1.71 0.62 0.55 
Good Ft and Bad 
Oj 
bad first 0.74 0.55 0.96 0.94 0.64 0.85 
one ad N/A 0.79 0.65 N/A 1.14 0.61 N/A 
 
1. Oj = orange juice, Ft = facial tissue 
2. In “Liking” and “Persuasiveness” columns are the absolute differences. 
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Table 2. Ads’ Liking scores given different positions in the presenting orders 
        
ad categories position mean std.D. N t p 
good orange juice same  1 5.769 1.355 39 0.471 0.639 
 2 5.900 1.088 39 
 different 1 5.333 1.153 39 1.464 0.147 
 2 5.705 1.091 39 
bad orange juice same  1 4.147 1.576 39 0.371 0.712 
 2 4.006 1.775 39 
 different 1 4.507 1.668 36 1.883 0.064 
 2 3.732 1.927 42 
good facial tissue same  1 5.736 1.002 37 2.950 0.004 
 2 4.978 1.162 34 
 different 1 5.048 1.549 42 0.611 0.543 
 2 5.248 1.303 36 
bad facial tissue same  1 3.699 1.437 34 0.300 0.765 
 2 3.581 1.833 37 
 different 1 4.404 1.724 39 0.925 0.358 
 2 4.051 1.646 39 
 
Table 3. Ads’ persuasiveness scores given different positions in the presenting orders 
ad categories position mean std.D. N t p 
good orange juice same  1 5.872 1.169 39 0.240 0.811 
 2 5.932 1.032 39 
 different 1 5.231 1.379 39 2.283 0.025* 
 2 5.846 0.964 39 
bad orange juice same  1 4.000 1.808 39 1.189 0.238 
 2 3.521 1.750 39 
 different 1 4.157 1.712 36 1.287 0.202 
 2 3.643 1.798 42 
good facial tissue same  1 5.595 0.979 37 2.190 0.032* 
 2 5.020 1.228 34 
 different 1 5.357 1.248 42 0.910 0.366 
 2 5.102 1.216 36 
bad facial tissue same  1 3.794 1.535 34 1.375 0.174 
 2 3.270 1.665 37 
 different 1 4.410 1.766 39 1.041 0.314 
 2 4.034 1.498 39 
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Appendix 
Stimuli 
Good Orange Juice Ad 
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Bad Orange Juice Ad 
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Good Facial Tissue Ad 
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Bad Facial Tissue Ad
 
 
 
